











Vertical and Horizontal FDI Technology Spillovers:  




Abstract:  This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) spillover, using an unbalanced 
panel data set of the manufacturing survey of Thailand during the period 2001-03.  In this paper, not 
only are both horizontal and vertical FDI technology spillovers examined, but the former is also 
assumed to vary across industries.  The key hypothesis is that horizontal FDI spillovers depend on 
the trade policy regime as well as the absorptive capability of locally owned plants.  Our panel data 
econometric analysis highlights the important role of the trade policy regime as a conditional gain of 
horizontal FDI spillovers.  In particular, positive horizontal FDI spillovers are found only in an 
industry operating in a relatively liberal environment.  Interestingly, imposing an assumption of 
identical horizontal FDI spillovers across industry could result in biased estimates of vertical FDI 
spillovers.  The key policy inference highlights the relative importance of the trade policy regime in 
harnessing the gain from foreign presence.  Liberalizing the foreign investment regime thus has to 
go hand in hand with liberalizing the trade policy to gain FDI technology spillovers.  Our finding 
here gives a warning not to overemphasize the role of linkages.  It is the quality  rather than 
magnitude of linkages that should be used a proxy of the magnitude of vertical FDI spillovers.  
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1.  Issues 
 
Enticing multinational enterprises (MNEs) to set up affiliations is placed high on 
the policy agenda in many countries, especially developing ones, as their entry would 
bring in much-needed capital, new production technologies, marketing techniques and 
management knowhow.  While all of these potential benefits of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) are viewed as important, particular emphasis is placed on 
technological gains in the productivity and competitiveness of the domestic industry, 
known as FDI technology spillovers (henceforth referred to as FDI spillovers).  As a 
result, the expectation of gaining from technology spillover persuades many developing 
countries to offer various incentives in order to attract FDI.   Nonetheless, only in some 
investment-receiving (host) countries are FDI spillovers empirically found. 
While tangible efforts have recently been made to gain a better understanding of 
the factors that determine the presence of FDI spillovers, they have not thus far borne 
fruit (Crespo& Fontoura, 2007).  The existing literature divides into two broad themes.   
First, horizontal FDI spillovers are assumed not to be automatic but are hypothesized as 
being a function of the economic environment and domestic policies in host countries. 
In this literature, two determinants have been generally recognized as conditioning gains 
from FDI.  These are the trade policy regime and the absorptive capability of locally 
owned enterprises.
1
                                                 
1  See the comprehensive survey in Görg & Greenaway (2004), Crespo & Fontoura (2007), and 
Hayakawa et al. (2008).  
   While both of these factors are acknowledged, most researchers 
have examined only the role of absorptive capability.  This may be because of the 
difficulty of finding a reliable proxy for protection across industries.  So far only a few 
studies (e.g. Kokko et al., 2001; Kohpaiboon, 2006a) have examined empirically the 
role of thetrade policy regime.  Additionally, there is a dearth of studies that bring 
absorptive capacity and the trade policy regime together in examining FDI spillovers.  
A major caveat of literature in this field is that it concentrates only on spillovers taking 




In fact, a number of recent studies
2
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the presence of FDI technology 
spillover in Thai manufacturing.  Panel data econometric analysis is conducted, using 
the Industrial Survey conducted by the Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry of 
Industry, during the period 2001-2003.  This is the most up to date and reliable plant 
survey available so far.  In the empirical model, we follow the general practice in this 
 argue that it is more likely that FDI spillovers 
would take place through backward and forward linkages (i.e. vertical FDI spillovers) as 
opposed to horizontal ones.  That is, where foreign investors involve themselves with 
indigenous enterprises in upstream and/or downstream industries, it is very likely that 
the latter will gain technological benefit from the former.  MNEs would have an 
incentive to prevent information leakage to their competitors, including local enterprises, 
thereby reducing the possibility of horizontal spillover taking place.  By contrast, there 
would be incentive for them to transfer knowledge to their local suppliers because such 
knowledge transfer would benefit the MNEs in terms of getting better input quality 
and/or cheaper costs, and receiving inputs on time.  It is also plausible that spillovers 
from MNEs in upstream industries exist to  provide  inputs that either were previously 
unavailable in the country or to make them technologically more advanced or less 
expensive, or to ensure that they are accompanied by the provision of complementary 
services (Javorcik, 2004).  
Empirical studies examining the presence of vertical FDI technology spillovers are 
sparse (Blomström et al. 2000; Lin & Saggi, 2005).  The notable exception is Javorcik 
(2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008) which examined cases in Lithuanian and 
Indonesian manufacturing sectors, respectively.  Their key finding supports the relative 
importance of vertical against horizontal FDI spillovers.  In particular, it was found that 
vertical FDI spillovers were statistically significant.  Nevertheless, a major caveat in 
these two studies is that their empirical model contains the implicit assumption that 
horizontal FDI spillovers are  identical for all industries.  As argued above such an 
assumption is rather restrictive.  In addition, the correlation between protection and the 
extent of industries generating backward linkages tends to be positive, and omitting the 
trade policy regime in examining FDI spillovers could create bias in the results.  
                                                 
2  They are Rodŕigueze-Clare (1996), Markusen & Venables (1999), Javorcik (2004), Lin & Saggi, 




research area, in which the productivity equation of locally owned plants in the 
manufacturing sector is estimated and the statistical relationship between plants’ 
productivity and the extent of foreign presence is examined.  This paper contributes to 
the existing literature in two ways.  First, in our econometric analysis both horizontal 
and vertical FDI spillovers are examined.  So far there have been few studies (e.g. 
Javorcik (2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008) examining both spillovers simultaneously.  
Additionally, our measure of backward and forward linkages takes into consideration 
both direct and indirect (inter-sectoral) repercussions.  This is different from Javorcik 
(2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008)  in which only the direct linkage is included.   
Secondly, we allow horizontal FDI spillovers to vary across industries.  Trade policy 
regime and absorptive capability are included in the empirical model as the key factors 
determining the extent of horizontal FDI spillovers.  
Thai manufacturing is a good laboratory for the issue in hand for two reasons.  
First, Thailand has been a large FDI recipient throughout the past three  decades.  
However, few studies have examined technology spillover in Thai manufacturing.  So 
far there have been two studies, Kohpaiboon (2006a) and Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich 
(forthcoming), both of which are based on the Industrial Census of 1996.  Hence, this 
paper not only provides up-to-date evidence but also re-examine the relative importance 
of spillover channels, and horizontal versus vertical spillovers.  Secondly, Thai 
manufacturing is broad-based as opposed to neighbouring countries, covering a wide 
range of industries from traditional labour-  intensive  industries like garment and 
footwear to several key industries in the machinery and transport equipment sector such 
as automotive, electronics, and electrical appliances.  Hence, evidence drawn from Thai 
manufacturing would provide an insightful lesson for other countries.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an analytical framework 
illustrating possible channels where FDI spillover could take place as well as the role of 
key determinants conditioning FDI spillovers.  In Section 3, patterns of labour 
productivity across industries are discussed and related to the extent of the foreign 
presence and the effective rate of protection.  The following section explains the 
empirical model used in this paper (Section 4).  Section 5 presents data and variable 
construction and regression results are in Section 6.  Conclusion and policy inferences 




2.  Analytical Framework 
 
While MNEs have the potential to generate considerable impact on host countries’ 
economies, it is often argued that spillovers are the most desirable benefit of all.  In 
general, there are at least three channels through which FDI spillovers can occur.  The 
first channel is the demonstration effect.  The presence of foreign firms can have a 
demonstration effect that allows local firms to become familiar with superior 
technologies, marketing and managerial practices used in foreign affiliates.  Thus, 
spillover can take place in the form of imitating the foreign subsidiaries’ technology.  
Over and above this, the presence of foreign affiliates can exert pressure on local firms 
exhibiting technical or allocation inefficiencies to adopt more efficient methods.  This 
allows local firms to survive successfully or even compete with foreign firms.  Since 
both demonstration and competition effects are likely to occur simultaneously, these 
two effects are regarded in the literature as a single channel of spillover.  
Linkage is the second channel of FDI spillovers.  Where foreign investors are 
linked to upstream and downstream industries in host countries, the linked indigenous 
firm has the possibility of gaining technological benefits.  The former is referred to as 
backward linkage and the latter as forward linkage.  By backward linkage, foreign 
investors establish an inter-firm relationship with local suppliers and create demand for 
inputs from local suppliers in upstream industries.  When these local firms are engaged 
to supply certain raw materials, the high quality, reliability and speed of delivery that 
MNE affiliates demand force them to enhance productivity.  Moreover, in some cases, 
local suppliers in upstream industries receive technical and managerial training in the 
production of the required inputs.  This is likely to generate additional economic 
activity and income, and to transfer technological and management skills to the host 
country.  
Similarly, forward linkage effects are created when one industry uses another 
industry’s output as its inputs.  Every activity that does not by its nature cater 
exclusively to final demand induces attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in other 
industries.  Benefits for domestic suppliers resulting from the presence of MNEs may be 




evident link is observed in the MNEs’ supply of higher quality inputs and/or at a lower 
price to domestic producers of end-user consumer goods.  The sum of the backward and 
forward linkages gives a total linkage effect, which can be seen as the growth in other 
new industries induced by establishing an MNE affiliates.  
The last channel is labour mobility. Foreign affiliates generally play a more active 
role than local firms in educating and training local labour.  Through this training and 
subsequent work experience, workers become familiar with the foreign affiliates’ 
technologies and production methods.  FDI spillovers through this channel occur when 
employees of foreign affiliates move on to local employers or set up their own business, 
using knowledge gained during their previous employment.   
Empirically, most econometric studies have only examined the presence of FDI 
spillovers through the demonstration and linkage channels simply because of data 
availability.  Analysis of labour mobility is very limited as researchers must have access 
to information about top managers’ backgrounds.  Unfortunately, such information is 
not usually available.
3
The recent studies such as Rodŕigueze-Clare (1996); Markusen & Venables 
(1999); Lin & Saggi (2005); Javorcik (2004); and Blalock & Gertler (2008) highlight 
the relative importance of vertical FDI spillovers as opposed to horizontal ones.  In 
particular, they argue that vertical FDI spillovers are likely.  For example Blalock & 
Gertler (2008) argue that it is hard to believe that horizontal FDI spillovers are likely.  
Firstly, the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms may often be wide.  
Local firms may lack the absorptive capacity needed to recognize and adopt new 
technology.  Similarly, the degree to which foreign and domestic firms actually compete 
in the same market will also vary.  It is possible, for example, that domestic firms may 
  Secondly, in theory, FDI spillovers through the demonstration 
effect can take place either within the same industry or across industries.  In practice, it 
is very difficult to measure the demonstration effect across industries so that spillovers 
through demonstration effects are usually referred to as horizontal FDI spillovers.  On 
the other hand, FDI spillovers through linkage occur  when MNEs are located in a given 
industry, and benefit upstream and downstream industries.  These are regarded as FDI 
vertical spillovers.  
                                                 
3  To the best of our knowledge so far, the only econometric analysis of spillovers through labour 




produce for the local market while MNEs produce for export.  Because of differences in 
quality and other attributes, exported and domestically consumed goods may entail 
different production methods thereby reducing the potential for technology transfer.  In 
contrast, technological benefits to local firms through vertical linkages are much more 
likely simply because MNEs have incentives to improve the productivity of their 
suppliers with the expectation of input cost reduction and quality improvement in return.  
Moreover, MNEs are likely to procure inputs requiring less sophisticated production 
techniques for which the gap is narrower.   
The key finding of Javorcik (2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008) supports the core 
hypothesis, i.e. only vertical FDI spillovers through backward linkages are found. 
Noticeably, the empirical model in both studies implicitly assumes that horizontal FDI 
spillovers, if they exist, must be identical in all industries.  In particular, locally owned 
enterprises operating in two different industries (e.g. capital versus labour intensive 
industries, restrictive versus liberal trade regime) would benefit identically from foreign 
presence in their industries.  This assumption seems to contradict a number of studies 
pointing out the heterogeneity of spillovers (Görg & Greenaway, 2004; Crespo & 
Fontoura, 2007; Hayakawa et al. 2008).  
In fact, the recent effort is to clarify what kinds of heterogeneity in MNEs and/or 
indigenous firms are crucial.  So far there have been two factors identified, namely the 
absorptive capability of indigenous firms and the trade policy regime.  Whether a local 
firm benefits from MNC presence depends on its capacity for assimilating knowledge-
its absorptive capability (Kokko et al. 1996; Girma et al., 2001; Girma & Görg, 2003; 
Kinoshita, 2001; Girma, 2005).  The hypothesis in the literature points out that the 
higher the absorptive capability, the greater the spillover the local firm in the host 
country can expect.  Note that the absorptive capability is referred to as the 
technological gap between MNE affiliates and indigenous firms (Kokko, 1994; 
Blomstrom & Sjohölm, 1999; Sjohölm, 1999). 
The trade policy regime is another factor to be considered, although there are few 
empirical studies examining its role in conditioning FDI technology spillovers.  As 
pioneered by Bhagwaiti (1973) as an extension to his theory of immiserizing  growth 
and further developed by Bhagwati (1985, 1994); Brecher & Diaz-Alejandro (1977); 




even negative, under a restrictive, import substitution (IS) regime compared with a 
liberalizing, export promotion (EP) regime (referred to as the ‘Bhagwati’s hypothesis’).  
FDI inflows enticed by an import substitution (IS) trade regime tend to be market-
seeking and are invested mostly in the industries where proprietary assets are important.  
This creates barriers to entry for local firms and thus constrains technology and 
efficiency spillovers.  In contrast, the export promotion (EP) regime is more conducive 
to generating favorable spillover effects because, under such a regime, FDI is mostly 
attracted to industries in which the country has comparative advantage, i.e. efficiency-
seeking FDI.  In such industries local firms have a greater potential to catch up with 
foreign firms and  achieve productivity improvement.  Additionally, domestic firms 
already exposed to foreign competition will probably have a great capacity not only to 
absorb foreign technology but also to counter the competition provided by MNEs in the 
local market, thereby precluding a negative impact through the competition channel 
(Crespo & Fontoura, 2007).  
While recognizing the important role of absorptive capability, trade policy is 
highlighted in this paper because it is highly policy relevant and there is room for 
improvement in the context of developing countries.  While progress on tariff reduction 
has occurred as a consequence of the Uruguay Round, it is clear that much remains to 
be done.  There has been a considerable decline in average tariff rates in developing 
countries, especially in Asia and Africa, but this has occurred in an uneven manner 
thereby increasing tariff dispersion.  This implies that countries with low average tariff 
rates are likely to have very high tariff peaks and exhibit escalation at higher levels of 
disaggregation (Jongwnaich & Kohpaiboon, 2007).  
More importantly, ignoring these two key determinants from econometric analysis 
of FDI spillovers studies could result in biased estimates as a consequence of omitting 
relevant variables.  This is especially true for the trade policy regime simply because 
there is likely to be a positive correlation between protection and the extent of industries 
generating backward linkage.  This is in line with the infant industry argument. 
Pioneered by Hirschman (1958), investible resources should be geared toward industries 
that have maximum linkages with the rest of economy. Such industries are usually 
capital intensive and economies of scale still matter; so that protection against foreign 




The widely cited example is the development strategy for automotive industry in 
developing countries which are likely to be a combination between restrictive local 
content requirement measures and a high cross-border protection.  Although industrial 
linkages were a part of import substitution industrialization strategy that has became 
less important since the 1980s, promoting linkages and policy-induced ones in 
particular have continued to linger in the minds of policymakers and development 
analysts (Athukorala, 1998; Pursell, 2001).    
 
 
3.  Patterns of Labour Productivity and Foreign Presence  
in Thai Manufacturing.  
 
This section aims to illustrate productivity difference between foreign and 
indigenous plants across industries disaggregated into 4 digit ISIC classification in the 
Thai manufacturing sector.  As well, the productivity difference is examined together 
with key variables in the paper’s core analysis, namely capital-labour ratio, the extent of 
foreign presence (FOR), effective rate of protection (ERP), and backward linkages 
index (BLI).
4
  Productivity here is measured by labour productivity, value added per 
workers.  Difference in labour productivity between foreign and locally owned plants as 
a per cent of the latter’s productivity is calculated.
5
The scattered plot in Figure 1 suggests that foreign plants generally have higher 
labour productivity than locally owned ones.  Most of industries stay above the 
   The calculated productivity 
difference is plotted together with difference in capital labour ratio between these two 
types of firms as shown in Figure 1 to reveal whether the former is more productive 
than the latter after accounting for difference in the capital-labour ratio.   These 
indicators are the average figure during the period 2001-03.   
                                                 
4  See full detail in Appendix 1. 
5  We do not report absolute number of labour productivity simply because they vary largely across 
industries.  For example, value added per worker of indigenous plants in 2001 was widely ranged 
from 95,891 baht/workers (ISIC 2029: other special purpose machinery) to 67,800,000 baht/workers 
(ISIC 1554: Soft Drink Industry).  Since our interest here is to address the issue whether foreign 
plants always exhibit higher labour productivity than indigenous ones instead of explaining 
difference of labour productivity across industries, we decide to report only the percentage 




horizontal axis implying the positive productivity difference.  The difference is 
averaged out at 107 per cent with the maximum of nearly 400 per cent in dairy product 
(ISIC 1520) and the minimum of -61.8 per cent in alcoholic beverages (ISIC 1551).  
Nevertheless, the positive productivity difference is largely due to the fact that foreign 
plants tend to be more capital intensive than their local counterparts as indicated by the 
observed positive relationship between productivity and capital-labour ratio differences.  
A (Spearman) rank correlation between difference in labour productivity and capital-
labour ratio is about 0.44 and statistically significant at the conventional level (5 per 
cent).  Hence, the observed figure of positive labour productivity difference is 
inadequate to conclude that foreign plants are superior to local ones unless the capital-
labour ratio is taken into consideration.  
There are six industries experiencing a negative and significant (greater than 30 per 
cent) difference in labour productivity: i.e. locally owned plants have higher labour 
productivity than foreign ones.  They are alcoholic beverages (ISIC 1551), Tobacco 
(ISIC 2925), veneer sheets (ISIC 2021), Paper pulp and paperboard (ISIC 2101), Toys 
(ISIC 3694) and animal feeds (ISIC 1533).  A common pattern observed among them is 
there are Thai conglomerates playing important roles.  One obvious example is 
alcoholic beverages (ISIC 1551) dominated by two Thai conglomerates such as Thai 
Beverages Public Company, and the Singha Corporation.  Similarly, in animal feeds and 
paper pulp industries, there are two Thai MNEs, the Chareon Pokphand Group (CP 
Group) and Siam Cement Group, respectively.  
We also examine foreign presence (FOR) measured in terms of output share
6
                                                 
6   See further discussion on why output share is our preferable choice in this study in Section 4. 
, 
effective rate of protection (ERP) and backward linkage index (BLI) in order to view 
their correlation with the average of plant productivity.  BLI here is constructed based 
on the Leontief inter-industry accounting framework which provides for the capture of 
both direct and indirect (inter-sectoral) repercussions in the measurement process.  It 
shows the total units of output required, directly and indirectly, from all sectors 
(including the unit of output delivered to final demand by the given sector) when the 





Figure 1. Correlation between Productivity Gap and Difference in Capital-labour  
Ratio between Foreign Establishment and Indigenous Plants  















































% Difference in labour productivity
 
Notes:  Productivity gap %∆(VA/L) is measured as the difference in labour productivity between 
foreign establishment and indigenous plants as a per cent of labour productivity of the latter.  % 
Difference in capital labour ratio between foreign establishment and indigenous plants %∆(K/L) is 
measured in the similar way as productivity gap.  Linear line here is based on the simple ordinary 
least square estimation in which %∆(VA/L) is a dependent variable and %∆(K/L) as the explanatory 
variable.  This is to draw general statistic inference.   
  , where t-statistics is in parentheses. 
Sources:  Author’s compilation.  See the full data in Appendix 1. 
 
Generally, foreign plants tend to locate in industries having a low effective rate of 
protection, as we found a negative correlation between FOR and ERP of -0.25 (Figure 
2).  The negative correlation is consistent with the trend of FDI inflows at the more 
aggregated level.  Up to the late 1970s, FDI was predominantly in import-substitution 
industries such as textiles, automobiles, and chemicals.  From then on, an increasing 
share of FDI was directed to more export-oriented activities.  To begin with, export-
oriented FDI went into light manufacturing industries such as clothing, textiles, 
footwear and toys.  More recently, labour-intensive assembly activities in the 
electronics and electrical goods industries have been the main attraction to foreign 
investors.  Interestingly, there is no clear relationship between FOR and BLI as their 
simple correlation approaches zero (Figure 3).  This reconfirms the proposition that FDI 
inflows in Southeast Asia including Thailand predominantly belong to the efficiency-




Figure 2. Correlation between Foreign Presence (FOR) and  



















Notes:  Linear line here is based on the simple ordinary least square estimation in which FOR is a 
dependent variable and ERP as the explanatory variable.  This is to draw general statistic inference. 
  , where t-statistics is in parentheses. 
Sources: Author’s compilation.  See the full data in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3. Correlation between Foreign Presence (FOR) and  














Notes:  The statistical relationship between FOR and BLI is not significantly different from zero 
based on the simple ordinary least square estimation in which FOR is a dependent variable and BLI 
as the explanatory variable.  
  , where t-statistics is in parentheses. 




4.  Model  
 
To examine the presence of technology spillover, we follow the standard practice 
in the literature.  This begins with estimating the production function of locally owned 
enterprises (Griliches, 1992; Javorcik, 2004; Crespo & Fontoura, 2007; Blalock & 
Gertler, 2008) A translog functional form is chosen to avoid the restriction imposed in 
the Cobb Douglas forms that were popular in the previous empirical studies of Thai 
manufacturing (e.g. Khanthachai et al., 1987; Tambunlertchai  & Ramstetter, 1991), i.e. 
unity of elasticity of substitution and log-linear relationship between inputs and outputs. 
The translog function form also controls for input levels and scale effects on value 
added. It is specified as equation (1); 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
01 2 3 4 5
2 22
5 6 78
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
          + ln ln ln
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
Y K PL NL K PL K NL
PL NL K X
ββ β β β β
β β ββ
= ++ + + + +
+ ++
  (1) 
where  ij Y    =  value added of plant i of industry j, 
          ij PL  =   number of production workers of plant i of industry j, 
          ij NL  =   number of non-production workers of plant i of industry j, 
          ij K    =   fixed assets of plant i of industry j , and  
          ij X    =   controlling variables in affecting plant productivity of plant i of industry j.   
 
In equation 1, there are three primary inputs, physical capital and two types of 
labour (i.e. production and non-production workers).  The latter is done to allow 
marginal products from them to be different.  Controlling variables include both firm- 
and industry-specific factors. 
The first controlling variable is the plants’ market orientation nature ( ij MKT ).  One 
clear-cut finding in the literature of the export-productivity nexus is that exporters are 
found to have higher productivity than non-exporters as firms would expect more 
intense competition in the global market than in the domestic market.  In addition, there 
are sunk costs induced by exports.
7
                                                 
7  Even though there is ongoing debate about whether firms become more productive before export 
(self-selection) or experience productivity gains after export (learning from export).   See the recent 
survey in Wagner (2007) and works cited therein. 




in the model with the theoretical expected positive sign.   ij MKT is measured a binary 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if firms’ export-sale ratio exceeds 25 per cent and 
zero otherwise.  The rationale of not using an actual export-output ratio is because the 
relationship between market orientation and productivity could be non-linear.  Firms 
planning to export must enhance their productivity to a certain level before export so 
that a positive relationship between market orientation and productivity is expected 
within a certain range of the export-output ratio only.  In this study, 25 per cent is 
arbitrarily used so that sensitivity analysis is conducted by using 20 and 30 per cent as 





















As guided by the theory and previous empirical work on the determinants of plant 
productivity differences, two industry-specific factors are taken into consideration. 
These are producer concentration and trade protection.  Because of its ease of 
measurement, producer concentration is often used by policy makers to signal the 
intensity of product market competition and justify any action in preventing any 
possibly anti-competitive behaviour.  Here  producer concentration is measured  by 
output share of the four largest firms (CR4).  The formulae to calculate CR4 are in 
equation (2).  
    (2) 
The impact of CR4 on plant productivity remains ambiguous nonetheless.  On the 
one hand, pioneered by Schumpeter (1942), productivity-enhancing activities typically 
involve large fixed costs, are irrecoverable upon exit, and are subject to a large degree 
of risk and uncertainty.  Hence, the expectation of some form of transient ex post market 
power is required for firms to have the incentive to invest in such activities.  This is 
especially true in the context of developing countries whose domestic market remains 
small (Roberts & Tybout, 1996).  Perfect competition is not necessarily conducive for 
productivity improvements.  On the other hand, the market power required is not a 
                                                 




sufficient condition for firms to commit to these activities as suggested by a number of 
empirical studies (Symeonidis, 1996; Ahn, 2002).  In fact, as these activities are not 
costless, a certain degree of market competition is needed to force each individual firm 
to speed up the adoption of new technology (Porter, 1990; Aghion, et al. 1999).  In 
many circumstance, the high level of producer concentration could retard productivity 
improvement. 
Protection is the second industry-specific variable controlled in the model.  The 
effect of protection on plant productivity has been long recognized in numerous 
previous studies but is ambiguous (e.g. Corden, 1974: Hart, 1983; Martin & Page, 1983; 
Scharfstein, 1988; Rodrik, 1991).  While protection can create economic rents that can 
be used for productivity improving activities, in practice an opposite effect can be seen.  
By insulating firms from foreign competition, high protection tends to induce producers 
to become ‘unresponsive’ to improved technological capability as well as to requests for 
improvement in the quality and price of what they offer (de Melo and Urata, 1986; 
Moran, 2001).  This in turn results in a general deterioration of technological and 
management skills.  Hence, the sign of trade protection is theoretically ambiguous.  
Protection is proxied by the effective rate of protection (ERP).  Even though there is no 
consensus between ERP and the nominal rate of protection (NRP) amongst economists 
as to choice of one over the other (Corden, 1966; Cheh, 1974), political bargains in Thai 
manufacturing are struck over ERP rather than NRP based on the econometric evidence 
of  Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon (2007).  
An interaction term between CONj and ERPj is introduced to rectify the major 
weakness of producer concentration in measuring the  degree of product market 
competition.  At best, producer concentration cannot capture dynamic aspects of 
competition especially from imports.  As mentioned above, competition is important for 
the positive impact of concentration on productivity.  In the competitive environment, 
the less productive firms tend to be “weeded out”, so a highly concentrated industry 
structure would be more conducive for firms to continue their innovative activities.  By 
contrast, in the absence of significant market competition, economic rents generated as a 
result of high producer concentration are likely to be captured by its managers (and 
workers) in the form of managerial slack or lack of effort.  All in all, this suggests that 




competition so that the interaction term is introduced.  The coefficient corresponding to 
the interaction is expected to be negative.  
The extent of foreign presence in an industry j (FORj) is introduced to examine 
horizontal technology spillovers, in some previous empirical studies, foreign presence 
can be captured by either output, employment or capital shares.  Expressing the foreign 
presence as an employment share tends to underestimate the actual role of foreign 
affiliates because MNE affiliates tend to be more capital intensive than locally non-
affiliated firms.
7  On the other hand, the capital share can easily be distorted by the 
presence of foreign ownership restrictions.  Such a restriction was in effect in Thailand 
during the study period (Kohpaiboon, 2006b).  Hence, the output share is the preferred 
proxy.  
As suggested in the previous studies, horizontal spillovers can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the absorptive capability of local plants and the nature of the 
trade policy regime.  The absorptive capability of the local plant is measured by the 
ratio of supervisory and management workers to total employment (QL) as supervisory 
and management workers are regarded as skilled labour.  The higher the ratio, the 
higher  the labour quality.  The expected sign of the corresponding coefficient is 
positive.  Trade policy regime is proxied by ERP.  The higher the ERP, the less the 
horizontal spillovers, so that the negative sign of the interaction term is expected.  
As argued above, FDI can also generate vertical spillovers through the linkage 
channel.  To do so, inter-industry linkage is established according to the Leontief inter-
industry accounting framework.  Consider  an input-output framework of the 
‘complementary import’ type (i.e. the input-output table, in which the import content of 
each transaction is separately identified and allocated to an import matrix)
9
dd X AX Y E = ++
; 
    (3) 
where  X = column vector of total gross output,  
          , 
dd d
ij ij ij j n
A a a XX  = =  = domestic input-output coefficient matrix, 
                                                 
9   Another type of Input-output (I-O) table is a ‘competitive import’ type in which all imports 
(intermediate plus final) are treated as competing with domestic production and thus imports are not 




         Y
d  = column vector of domestic demand on domestically produced goods, and  
         E = column vector of export demand on domestically produced goods.   
 
Solving equation (1) for X ,  
  ( )
1
1
dd X A YE
−
 = −+    (4) 
where (1-A
d)
-1 is the Leontief domestic inverse (LDI) matrix.   
Consider a row vector j, each element in the row, say bij, indicates amount of 
industry j’s output demand by an additional unit of industry i’s output produced, i.e. 
derived demand for industry j’s output from industry i’s  production.  Note that bij 
captures both direct and indirect (inter-sectoral) repercussions in the measurement 
process.  This is different from Blalock (2001), Schoors & van der Tol (2001) both cited 
in Javorcik (2004: 612) and Blalock & Gertler (2008) whose backward linkage proxy 
captures only the direct demand for industry j, an element in input-output matrix.  A 
product between each element in row vector j and its corresponding degree of foreign 
presence (FORj) measures to a certain extent derived demand from foreign presence for 
industry j’s output.  Hence, the sum of the product from column 1 to n indicates total 
derided demand for industry j’s products from foreign plants, backward linkages from 
foreign plants.  The higher the BACKj, the greater the backward linkages.  This implies 
the greater vertical spillover through backward linkages and the positive sign of 
coefficient corresponding to BACKj is expected.  Note that inputs supplied within the 
industry j are excluded as they are already captured by FORj.  
In a column vector i in LDI matrix, each element, say bik, indicates demand for 
industry k’s output to be used as inputs for producing a unit of industry i’s output.  
When we multiply each element in column vector i with its corresponding foreign share 
(FORk), the product  indicates intermediates of  industry  i  supplied by foreign plants 
located in in industry k.   Hence, the sum of products would reflect a fraction total 
intermediates used in industry i supplied by foreign plants, i.e. the forward linkage from 
foreign presence.  The greater the value of FORWj, the larger, the extent of foreign 




to be positive.  For the same reason as before, inputs purchased within the industry j are 
not included.  
Finally, two sets of binary dummy variables are included in the model.  First, two 
time dummy variables (t2002 and t2003) are included to capture time-specific fixed 
effects, with 2001 as the base dummy.  Secondly as argued in a number of studies such 
as Cohen & Levin (1989) and Moulton (1990), studies of the firm size-innovative 
activity relationship need to control for industry effects at a high level of aggregation, 
e.g. 2-digit level, especially when using a sample covering many industries.  In 
particular, standard errors are corrected to take into account the fact that the measures of 
potential spillovers are industry-specific while the observations in the dataset are at the 
firm level.  Falling to make such a correction could lead to a serious downward bias in 
the estimated errors thus resulting in a spurious finding of statistical significance of the 
aggregate variation of interest.  It becomes even more important for those undertaken in 
the context of developing countries where large firms are likely to be diversified and 
operate in more than one industry.
10
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  As a result, industry dummy variables at the 2 digit 
ISIC industry classification are introduced.  
All in all, the estimating equation of FDI technology spillover is as follows 
(theoretical expected sign is given in parenthesis); 
   (5) 
where  
ln ijt Y   =  Value added of plant i in industry j at time t , 
ln ijt PL   =  Number of production workers of plant i in industry j at time t , 
ln ijt NL   =  Number of non-production workers of plant i in industry j at time t , 
ln ijt K   =  Fixed assets of plant i in industry j at time t , 
i CON (+/-)  =  Producer concentration of industry j measured by the sum of market 
share of top four plants , 
j ERP  (+/-)  =  Effective rate of protection in industry j , 
                                                 
10   The conglomerate nature of large firms is very prominent in Southeast Asian economies 




ijt MKT (+)   =  Market orientation of plant i  in industry j  at time t  measured 
alternatively by binary dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the 
export-output ratio exceeds 25 per cent and zero otherwise, 
j FOR  (+/-)  =  Foreign presence in industry j measured by output share of foreign 
plants to total sales captured horizontal spillovers, 
* j ijt FOR QL  (+)  =  MNE technology spillover gain conditioned by  ijt QL  (i.e. Absorptive 
capability hypothesis) , 
* jj FOR ERP  (-)  =  MNE technology spillover gain conditioned trade policy regime (i.e. 
Bhagwati’s hypothesis) , 
ijt QL    =  Quality of labour of plant i in industry j at time t measured by the 
ratio of supervisory and management workers to total employment , 
j BACK   (+)  =  Backward linkages spillover from foreign presence to industry j, 
j FORW  (+)  =  Forward linkages spillover of foreign presence to industry j , 
t2002  =  Time dummy for 2002 which is one if observation is in 2002 and 
zero otherwise, 
t2003  =  Time dummy for 2003 which is one if observation is in 2003 and 
zero otherwise, 
j ID   =  Industry dummy at 2 digit ISIC classification, and  




5.   Data and Variable Construction 
 
In this study, the Industry Survey by the Office of Industrial Economics, Ministry 
of Industry (OIE Survey) during the period 2001-03 is used.
11  The survey is available 
from 2001 to 2006 but the quality of unpublished returns of the last three years survey 
(2004-6) is rather problematic.  In particular, they are subject to inconsistency in 
industry identification of samples, to a matching problem between sales figures and 
other plants’ basic information allocated in separated sheets, and to a sharp decline in 
sample number.
12
                                                 
11  The alternative data set is the 1997 industrial census that is quite dated and has been empirically 
used in a number of studies (e.g. Kohpaiboon, 2006a; Kohpaiboon & Ramstetter, 2008; Jongwanich 
& Kohpaiboon, 2009; Kohpaiboon & Jongwanich, forthcoming). 
12  In particular, the number of plants covered in the OIE Survey 2006 dropped sharply to less than 
2,000 plants. 





There are 4,365, 3,986, and 3,521 plants in the 2001, 2002 and 2003 Surveys, 
respectively (Table  1).  The survey was first cleaned up by identifying duplicated 
samples (i.e. plants belonging to the same firm which filled in the questionnaire using 
the same records) in the survey.  The procedure followed in dealing with this problem 
was to treat as duplicates the records that report the same values of the five key 
variables of interest in this study, namely registered capital, output value, domestic 
sales, domestic raw materials, imported raw materials.  As a consequence, nine samples 
were identified and dropped.  Secondly, plants were removed which had not responded to 
one or more of the key questions and which had provided seemingly unrealistic information 
such as the negative value added, no report of worker numbers, capital stocks, or the initial 
capital stock of less than 10,000 baht.  Finally, we excluded micro-enterprises which are 
defined as plants with less than 10 workers.  After the data cleaning above the number 
of samples dropped to 3,373, 3,328 and 3,153 samples for Survey 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
On average, the coverage of the OIE survey accounted for around 40.1, 49.6, and 24.8 
per cent of value added, gross output, and workforce, respectively, of the manufacturing 
sector.  Table 1 provides a summary of survey characteristics and the extent to which it 
represents the whole manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 1.  Sample Coverage of Office of Industrial Economics Survey 
Year 
% of Thai Manufacturing Sector    Number of Plants 
Value 




2001  45.3  52.6  24.5    4,365  3,373 
2002  41.1  53.7  25.5    3,986  3,328 
2003  33.8  42.4  24.5    3,521  3,153 
Average  40.1  49.6  24.8       
Source:  Author’s compilation from OIE Survey whereas value added and output of the 
manufacturing sector are from National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB).  
Labor force is from Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008, Asian Development Bank. 
 
All nominal variables are converted to real terms (1988 price) by the corresponding 
producer price deflator at the 4-digit ISIC classification.  Value added is defined as the 




whereas capital stock is represented by the value of fixed assets at the initial period.  
The other information related to plant-specific variables (i.e. OWN  and  MKT  ) are 
reported in the survey.  
CR4 is obtained from Kophaiboon & Ramstetter (2008) in which the concentration 
is measured at the more aggregate level (e.g. many measured at the 4-digit whereas 
some at the 3-digit ISIC classification) to guard against possible problems arising from 
the fact that two reasonably substitutable goods are treated as two different industries 
according to the conventional industrial classification at high level of disaggregation. 
Data on ERP estimates are from Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon (2007).  They are ERP 
2003 estimates, reflecting the protection structure in 1997-2003 as there was no major 
change in tariff during this period.  In addition, the ERP series used is the weighted 
average of import-competing and export-oriented ERP.  The latter is referred to ERP 
estimates for exporters who are eligible for various tariff rebate programs.  Since ERP is 
based on the input-output (IO) industrial classifications, the official concordance is used 
to convert them into 4-digit ISIC.  In a case that there is not one-to-one matching in the 
concordance, the weighted average is applied using value added as a weight.   
The ideal dataset for measuring BACKj and FORWj is detailed information of inter-
industry relationship between local and foreign enterprises, how much the former sells 
to or buys from the latter.  Nevertheless, our choice is driven in part by data limitations. 
Hence inter-industry relationship to measure BACKj and FORWj is based on Thailand’s 
input-output table consisting of 180 economic activities (42 in agriculture and primary 
sectors 93 in the manufacturing sector and the rest in the service sector).  One caveat 
when using Thailand’s input-output table is that car assembly and several metallic parts 
manufactures such as body parts and inner panels are lumped into a single category, (IO 
125 motor vehicle) so that backward linkages measured would be to a certain extent 
underestimated.  The same procedure applied for ERP is used to match input-output 
(IO) industrial classifications to 4-digit ISIC. 
To measure FOR using OIE survey would be problematic as the survey coverage is 
rather limited.  As discussed the surveys cover at most 50 per cent of the manufacturing 
sector’s gross output and it is likely that foreign affiliates are covered in the survey 
because of their relatively large firms.  Hence, FOR measured from the survey tends to 




presence in the sector.  This would also mitigate any possible simultaneity bias in 
estimating the spillover equation (see below for further discussion).  Hence, in this 
study, FOR is constructed using the Industrial Census 1996 which accounted for 76.2 
per cent of the manufacturing sector’s gross outputs.  In the census, all plants with FDI 
(regardless of the magnitude of the foreign share in their capital stock) are considered to 
be foreign rather than local plants.  The cutting point (i.e. zero per cent) seems to be 
slightly higher than what is widely used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
other institutes such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the US Department of Commence as well as several scholars studying 
multinational firms (IMF, 1993; Lipsey, 2001), i.e. 10 per cent.  However, the choice is 
dictated by data availability.  Information on foreign ownership in the census is reported 
with a wide range, i.e. zero, less than 50, greater 50 and 100 per cent foreign shares. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide a statistical summary of all variables discussed above and their 
correlation matrix.  
 
Table 2.  A Statistical Summary of the Key Variables 
  Unit  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
ijt VD   (ln) million baht  16.32  1.92  6.00  24.00 
ijt K   (ln)million baht)  16.11  2.36  5.00  24.00 
ijt NL   (ln) workers  2.71  1.35  0.00  7.00 
ijt PL   (ln) workers  4.50  1.44  0.00  9.00 
ijt MKT   zero-one dummy  0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00 
j CON   (ln) proportion  0.44  0.11  0.23  0.69 
j ERP   (ln) proportion  0.12  0.14  -0.30  0.58 
j FOR   (ln) proportion  0.36  0.15  0.00  0.69 
ijt QL   (ln) proportion  0.16  0.11  0.00  0.67 
j BACK   (ln) proportion  1.08  0.90  0.02  7.17 
j FORW   (ln) proportion  1.23  1.00  0.00  5.27 
Notes:    (a)  Mean = simple average; SD = standard deviation; Min = minimum; and Max = 
maximum; (b) Estimates of VDijt, Kijt, NLijt and PLijt are the logarithmic transformation of their value.  
The other variables are converted into logarithmic form as log (1+x) where x is the variable  




Table 3.  Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
  VDijt  Kijt  NLijt  PLijt  MKTijt  CONj  ERPj  FORj  QLijt  BACKj  FORWj 
VDijt  1.00                     
Kijt  0.75  1.00                   
NLijt  0.71  0.65  1.00                 
PLijt  0.77  0.66  0.72  1.00               
MKTijt  0.28  0.19  0.27  0.40  1.00             
CONj  -0.11  -0.13  -0.06  -0.07  0.05  1.00           
ERPj  0.01  -0.05  0.01  0.09  0.12  0.15  1.00         
FORj  -0.03  -0.05  -0.07  -0.05  -0.01  0.11  -0.15  1.00       
QLijt  -0.10  -0.04  0.30  -0.36  -0.22  0.00  -0.12  -0.02  1.00     
BACKj  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  0.10  -0.03  0.25  -0.01  1.00   
FORWj  -0.11  -0.05  -0.13  -0.20  -0.22  0.04  -0.23  0.19  0.09  0.09  1.00 
Source:  Author’s computations based on data sources described in the text. 
 
 
6.  Regression Results 
 
To examine the presence of spillover from FDI, an unbalanced panel econometric 
procedure is applied.  We used the random effect estimator as our preferred estimation 
technique.  The alternative fixed effect estimator is not appropriate because our model 
contains a number of time-invariant variables (CONj,  ERPj  and  FORj,  BACKj, and 
FORWj) all of which are central to our analysis.  A major limitation of the random effect 
estimator compared to its fixed effect counterpart is that it can yield inconsistent and 
biased estimates if the unobserved fixed effects are correlated with the remaining 
component of the error term.  However, this is unlikely to be a serious problem in our 
case because the number of explanatory variables is larger than the number of ‘within’ 
observations (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 10).  The random effect estimator also has the 
added advantage of taking caring of the serial correlation problem.  The results are 
reported in Table 5.  Nevertheless, the corresponding pooled cross-section estimations 




section estimates are remarkably similar, suggesting that unobserved effects would be 
relatively unimportant in our model.  
Studies of FDI spillovers are subject to a criticism about a possibility of a 
simultaneity problem.  The positive relationship between foreign presence and plant 
productivity might be interpreted as reflecting the fact that foreign investment gravitates 
towards more productive industries rather than representing any technology spillover 
from FDI (Haddad & Harrison, 1993; Aitken & Harrison, 1999).  The general response 
in the literature is to undertake  fixed-effect panel estimation.  Nevertheless, our 
estimation results are less likely to be subject to a simultaneity problem as FOR in this 
study is a pre-determined variable obtained from the 1996 industrial census.  In theory, 
it is arguable that a pre-determined variable might contain expectations of future 
outcomes hence the simultaneity problem remains unsolved.  For example, current 
investment of MNEs would be a result of their expectation of productivity gains in the 
future.  This argument is less likely to apply for this study since foreign presence here is 
measured by output share of current economic activities, and is unlikely to contain any 
future expectation.  Even though FOR reflects the distribution of foreign presence in 
1996, as argued in Ramstetter (2003), the relative importance of foreign firms remains 
unchanged during the past decade starting in 1996.   
   
6.1.  Is the Foreign Plant More Productive Than The Locally-owned One? 
Before we examine whether there are FDI spillovers and its relative importance 
between horizontal and vertical spillovers, we ask a simple question; is the foreign plant 
is more productive than the locally owned one?  Even though it is theoretically expected 
that MNC affiliates should be more productive than locally non-affiliated firms (Caves, 
2007), it is not always true as suggested in several empirical studies such as Ramstetter 
(2006) in the case of Thai manufacturing. Menon (1998) and Oguchi et al. (2002) in the 
case of Malaysian manufacturing.  
To do so, Equation 5 discussed above is modified.  First, the sample will cover 
both foreign- and locally owned plants.  Second, FOR  and its related variables (its 
interaction terms with ERPj and QLijt as well as BACKj, and FORWj) are replaced by 




foreign ownership is greater than 10 per cent and zero otherwise.  By definition, FDI 
reflects the objective of an entity resident in one country to obtain a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the host country enterprise, in which the 
former has a significant degree of influence on the management of the latter.  However, 
the significant degree does not necessarily mean majority ownership.  Hence this study 
follows the dominant current definition by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
other institutes such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the US Department of Commence as well as several scholars studying 
multinational firms, which use 10 per cent.
13
A coefficient corresponding to OWN is statistically significant.  It suggests that all 
other things (e.g. inputs level and scale effects) being equal, the foreign plant tends to 
exhibit higher value added than the locally owned one.  The coefficient of 0.21 indicates 
   Nevertheless, we also use the actual 
foreign ownership share (OWN1) as an alternative measure to examine the sensitivity of 
results.  A statistical significance of OWN indicates the productivity difference.  
The result of the productivity determinant equation is reported in Table 4.  The first 
and second columns are the results of pooled cross-sectional and random-effected 
estimations, respectively.  Our following discussion will be based on the latter because 
of the reasons discussed above.  The estimated equation passes the Wald- test for overall 
statistical significance at the 1 per cent level.  The statistical significance of coefficients 
corresponding to the primary inputs (capital, production workers and non-production 
workers), their interactions, and some of their squared terms suggests that the 
assumption imposed in the Cobb-Douglas production function is not supported by plant-
level panel data of Thai manufacturing.  Even though translog functional form 
specification is likely to be affected by the multicollinearity problem and standard error 
is inflated, coefficients associated with the squared values of capital and production 
workers are statistically significant at the one per cent level or better.  It suggests that 
such a multicollinearity problem would not create any severe effect on the regression 
outcome.  In particular, in the presence of the multicollinearity problem the effect still 
shows up, simply because the true value itself is so large that even an estimate on the 
downside still shows up as significant (Johnson, 1984: 249).  
                                                 
13   For example, the early Harvard studies under the direction of Raymond Vernon: Vaupel & 




that the productivity difference between foreign and locally owned plants is about 21 
per cent on average after controlling input levels and scale effects.  We also find that 
exporting firms tend to exhibit a higher level of productivity than non-exporting ones as 
the coefficient corresponding to MKT turns out to be positive and significant.  Such 
evidence supports the consensus in the literature of the export-productivity nexus that 
export-oriented plants tend to be more productive than domestic-oriented plants. 
Impacts of producer concentration and trade protection on plant productivity are to 
certain extent consistent with the findings of previous studies, i.e. Kohpaiboon & 
Jongwanich (forthcoming) using the , Industrial Census 1996 data set.  That is, the net 
impact of  producer concentration on plant productivity is not automatic, but  does 
depend on the degree of tariff protection.  Tariff reduction must reach a certain level 
before the potential positive impact of producer concentration on productivity is 
observed.  Similarly, insulating firms from foreign competition is not sufficient to 
promote plant productivity improvement.  In a highly concentrated industry, high 
protection tends to induce producers to become ‘unresponsive’ to improved 
technological capability and to retard productivity growth.
14
                                                 
14  Statistical significance of the interaction coefficient is very marginal at 15 per cent (one-tailed 
test).  As seen in Section 6.2 when the sample covers only locally owned firms, the interaction term 
turns out to be statistically significant at five per cent.  This would be consistent to the aggregate 
trend discussed in Section 3 that foreign plants in Thailand tend to be located in efficient-seeking 
industries especially electronics, electrical appliances and automobiles. In fact FDI in automobile 
industry started with the traditional tariff-hopping style which aimed for a highly protected domestic 
market.  As argued in Kohpaiboon (2006b and 2007), FDI inflows increased significantly in the 
1990s with a shift in investment motivation to efficiency-seeking. Such foreign plants are keen to 
improve their production efficiency and strengthen their international competitiveness.  This occurs 
even in a highly concentrated environment.  Therefore, when foreign plants are included, this could 
weaken  the proposed non-linear relationship among productivity, producer concentration and 
protection to some extent. 




Table 4.  Regression Results of Productivity Determinants 
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# Observations  9,815  9,815 (3,963 groups) 
F-stat  1132.9 ***  19788.5 *** 
R-sq  0.78  0.78 
RESET  1.50 (p=0.21)   
Notes:  OLS = Ordinary Least Squares whereas RE = Random Effect Estimation; The number in the 
parenthesis of OLS is t-statistics constructed from robust standard error whereas that of RE is z-
statistics.  RESET is the RESET- functional form misspecification tests;
 ***,**, * and 
δ indicates a 
statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 and 15 per cent level, respectively.   




6.2.  Horizontal and Vertical FDI Spillovers 
In this subsection the core hypothesis of this paper, namely the presence of 
horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers, is addressed.  Their regression results are 
reported in Table 5.  While both pooled cross-sectional and random-effect estimations 
are reported in the first two columns of Table 5  for the sake of comparison, our 
discussion will emphasise random-effect estimations.  The overall significance test 
(Wald  test) is passed at the one per cent level.  In general, most of the firm-  and 
industry-specific variables (i.e. K, NL, PL, MKT, CR4, ERP and  4* CR ERP ) turn out to 
be statistically significant and are in line with what are found in the productivity 
determinant equation in the previous section.   
Regression results support the hypothesis that horizontal FDI spillovers can vary 
across industry.  The found negative coefficient of FOR*ERP  fails to reject  the 
‘Bhagwati hypothesis’.  Given the extent of foreign presence, locally owned plants 
operating in industries with more liberal trade regimes exhibit higher value added than 
those operating in the less liberal regimes.  The evidence that the coefficient of FOR is 
not statistically different from zero points out that foreign presence could either 
negatively or positively affect the local plant’s productivity, depending on the nature of 
the trade policy regime, i.e. ERP greater or less than zero.  As shown in Figure 2, there 
are many export-oriented industries experiencing negative ERP such as processed foods 
(ISIC 1511 and 1512), leather products (ISIC 1911).  The negative figure is largely due 
to the presence of cost in tariff drawback schemes (e.g. bank guarantees).  The 
econometric findings in these studies are also in line with those in previous studies, i.e. 
Balasubramanyam  et al.  (1996), Athukorala & Chand (2000), Kohpaiboon (2003: 





Table 5.  Regression Results: Horizontal and Vertical FDI Technology Spillover 
 
Heterogeneous Horizontal Spillovers  Identical Horizontal Spillovers 
Pooled-cross 
Section  RE  Pooled-cross 
Section  RE 













































































































































   




   
















# Observations  6,907  6,907 
(2,843 groups) 
6,907  6,907 
(2,843 groups) 
F-stat  565.3***    597.2***   
Wald-test (χ




0.74  0.74 
0.02 
0.80 
0.74  0.74 
0.02 
0.80 
RESET  0.55 
(p=0.65) 
  0.82 
(p=0.48) 
 
Notes:  OLS = Ordinary Least Squares whereas RE = Random Effect Estimation; The number in the 
parenthesis of OLS is t-statistics constructed from robust standard error whereas that of RE is z-
statistics.  RESET is the RESET- functional form misspecification tests:
 ***, **, * and 
δ indicates a 
statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 and 15 per cent level, respectively.  




The interaction between foreign presence and absorptive capability is not 
statistically different from zero.  The statistic insignificance does not reject the role of 
absorptive capability in conditioning gains from horizontal FDI spillovers.  The failure 
to uncover its statistic significance could be due to a measuring problem.  In particular, 
the definition of non-production workers in the survey is wide, covering not only 
supervisors and management workers but also clerical and administrative staff. 
Interestingly when identical horizontal spillovers are relaxed, statistical significance of 
vertical spillovers from both backward and forward linkages is not found.  The 
coefficient corresponding to  j BACK  is positive but not statistically different from zero.  
The coefficient corresponding to  j FORW  turns out to be negative but insignificant.   
In general, the key finding in this study (that there are only horizontal spillovers, 
not vertical ones) run counter to that of Javorcik, (2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008) 
relating to Lithunian and Indonesian manufacturing sectors, respectively.  They have 
uncovered a statistically significant positive spillover through backward linkages but 
not horizontal spillovers.  We suspect that the failure to appropriately control for 
relevant explanatory variables may have biased the results of these studies.  
Interestingly, our data set permits us to replicate their results through similar (arbitrary) 
variable choice.  That is, equation 5 is re-estimated by dropping two interaction terms 
with horizontal FDI spillovers, i.e.  imposing an assumption of identical horizontal 
spillovers.  The results are in line with Javorcik (2004) and Blalock & Gertler (2008). 
Only  the coefficient corresponding to j BACK  is statistically significant at 10 per cent.   
We rather argue that our model is more preferable as the results seem to be in line 
with the industrialization path in developing countries including Thailand.  As argued in 
Hugh (2001) several developing Southeast Asian economies pursue the so called 
‘dualistic approach’ in opening up international trade, i.e. they are still reluctant to cut 
tariffs  but opt for tariff drawback schemes as a key instrument to promote an export-led 
industrialization strategy.  For instance, Thailand has been conservative in opening the 
door for foreign made goods for the past three decades, as indicated in the fact that its 
applied tariff rates remain at the highest  of the six original ASEAN countries 




Under such a policy setup, two options are available for entrepreneurs, including 
MNEs.  In Option 1, entrepreneurs aim to be a part of the global economy in which 
resource allocation is directed according to factor proportion consideration for neo-
classical efficiency.  Firms in this option tend to be more export-oriented.  By contrast, 
Option 2 encourages entrepreneurs to set up plants and supply highly protected local 
markets in order to benefit from protection-induced economic rents.  Even though 
MNEs can occur in both options, MNEs existing in the first option (efficiency-seeking 
MNEs) tends to be more beneficial than those in the second option (market-seeking 
MNEs) argued in Athukorala and Chand (2000) based on US MNEs experience.   
In this circumstance, backward linkages would hardly occur and nor would vertical 
spillovers.  Export-oriented firms including MNEs are unlikely to source local 
intermediates because of the presence of intermediate tariffs so that they seem to 
operate in ‘enclaves’ in isolation from local suppliers.  In the meantime, highly 
protected domestic markets encourage indigenous suppliers to find their own niche 
markets that are not directly related to what exporting firms want.  As long as the 
policy-induced incentive structure still creates the economic rents, it would be difficult 
to find qualified suppliers.  
That would explain why MNEs which have played an important role in Thailand’s 
industrialization generate limited backward linkages to indigenous firms.  Limited 
backward linkages are observed in several leading export-oriented industries in 
Thailand such as the automotive, garment and hard disk drive industries (Kohpaiboon, 
2006b; 2007 and 2008 and 2009).  For example, while locally assembled vehicles in 
Thailand are reliant largely on locally manufactured parts, as illustrated by the 
proportion of imported parts to vehicle production, the number of purely Thai firms 
must be around 10 suppliers, comparing to 287 MNE suppliers.  Another example, the 
ratio of imported fabric to garment production in Thailand has been increasing since 
1996 (Kohpaiboon, 2008: Figure 4).  The same evidence is also found in the case of the 






7.  Conclusion and Policy Inferences  
 
This paper examines FDI spillovers in Thai manufacturing, using industrial 
surveys during the period 2001-03.  A panel data econometric analysis of plant 
productivity determinants of locally owned plants is undertaken.  The paper goes 
beyond the existing  literature in two ways.  First, both horizontal and vertical FDI 
spillovers are tested.  In addition, both direct and indirect (inter-sectoral) repercussions 
are captured in the measurement process of industrial linkages.  Secondly, horizontal 
FDI spillovers are allowed to be different from one industry to the other instead of 
assuming identical values across industries.   
The key finding is that advanced technology associated with MNE affiliates does 
not always spill over to the local plants operating in the same industry.  The extent of 
spillovers depends on the nature of the trade policy regime.  Only industries operating 
under a liberal trade policy regime experience positive horizontal FDI spillovers.  
Neither backward nor forward spillovers are found in our study.  This seems to be in 
contradiction with the existing literature highlighting the relative importance of 
backward linkages as a likely FDI spillover channel.  Statistical significance of vertical 
spillovers through backward linkages is found only if an assumption of identical 
horizontal FDI spillover is in place.  Such an assumption seems to be restrictive.  The 
finding that export-oriented plants have higher productivity than domestic-market-
oriented ones further highlight the role of trade policy regime on plant productivity 
improvement process.  Trade liberalization and its induced contestability environment 
are an effective catalyst for firms to continue to improve their productivity.  Besides, 
only in low tariff environment, the positive impact of producer concentration on plant 
productivity is observed. 
Two policy inferences can be drawn from this study.  First these results further 
highlight the relative importance of the  trade policy regime for  productivity 
enhancement and thus development policy.  Liberalizing the foreign investment regime 
thus has to go hand in hand with liberalizing trade policy to maximize gains from MNE 
presence.  Trade liberalization itself also creates contestability environment that is 




relative importance of the linkage channel and its corresponding spillovers seems to be 
a convincing argument, our work here provides a warning for policymakers not 
overemphasize it.  The conducive role of the backward linkage channel is a result of 
natural links that are driven by economic concerns and can be distorted by policy 
measures.  The ability of the policy domain to forge linkages seems to be limited.  
Policy-induced linkages are not perfectly substitutes for natural linkages.  This issue is 
increasingly important under a rising threat of the return of nationalism and 
protectionism in the incoming global economic recession.  The magnitude of linkages is 
not a good proxy of the magnitude of vertical FDI spillovers.  The quality of backward 
linkages is a far better indication.    Where quality  is concerned, backward linkages 
driven by economic concerns as well as motivated by capability of indigenous suppliers 






Appendix 1:  Patterns of Labour Productivity (%∆(VA/L)), Capital-Labour Ratio (%∆(K/L)), Foreign Presence (FOR),  
Backward Linkage Index (BLI) and Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) of Thai Manufacturing 










  FOR  BLI  ERP 
1511  Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products  13.1  105.6  0.32  0.91  -0.14 
1512  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products  10.2  -46.2  0.29  0.72  -0.08 
1513  Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  0.8  42.8  0.27  0.47  0.15 
1514  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  30.9  -27.2  0.13  0.42  0.39 
1520  Manufacture of dairy products  391.7  24.2  0.21  0.58  0.12 
1531  Manufacture of grain mill products  42.6  -61.5  0.13  0.66  0.14 
1532  Manufacture of starches and starch products  160.9  277.7  0.39  0.57  0.12 
1533  Manufacture of prepared animal feeds  -36.2  14.8  0.23  0.59  -0.11 
1541  Manufacture of bakery products  80.1  104.4  0.12  0.70  0.25 
1542  Manufacture of sugar  16.0  47.4  0.21  0.84  0.42 
1543  Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  72.2  295.5  0.32  0.66  0.12 
1544  Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products  40.4  64.4  0.27  0.84  0.42 
1549  Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.  122.0  -43.8  0.51  0.59  0.05 
1551  Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits; ethyl alcohol production from fermented 
materials  -61.8  -36.7  0.00  0.61  0.42 
1552  Manufacture of wines  n.a.  n.a.  0.67  0.65  0.57 
1553  Manufacture of malt liquors and malt  249.1  281.2  0.02  0.34  0.58 
1554  Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters  84.4  111.8  0.48  0.51  0.02 
1600  Manufacture of tobacco products  217.4  -57.1  0.04  0.19  0.55 
1711  Preparation and spinning of textile fibres; weaving of textiles  102.2  121.0  0.47  0.63  0.15 
1712  Finishing of textiles  n.a.  n.a.  0.34  0.58  0.22 
1721  Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel  8.1  -68.4  0.54  0.71  0.36 
1722  Manufacture of carpets and rugs  n.a.  n.a.  0.58  0.74  0.06 
1723  Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting  n.a.  n.a.  0.34  0.64  0.12 
1729  Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.  118.9  244.6  0.63  0.64  0.18 
1730  Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles  -0.6  37.9  0.39  0.65  0.13 
1810  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel  18.0  -11.4  0.31  0.68  0.37 
1911  Tanning and dressing of leather  65.2  161.9  0.24  0.89  -0.30 














  FOR  BLI  ERP 
1920  Manufacture of footwear  -8.7  -16.0  0.29  0.64  0.06 
2010  Sawmilling and planing of wood  27.8  186.0  0.15  0.29  0.02 
2021  Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board and other 
panels and boards  -49.0  -10.3  0.37  0.35  0.03 
2022  Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery  61.3  49.4  0.06  0.35  0.03 
2029  Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting 
materials  n.a.  n.a.  0.21  0.54  0.45 
2101  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  -44.6  106.5  0.52  0.33  0.03 
2102  Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard  53.2  78.5  0.16  0.35  0.13 
2109  Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard  112.3  100.3  0.50  0.41  0.15 
2221  Printing  23.3  -20.6  0.10  0.46  0.17 
2320  Manufacture of refined petroleum products  370.3  817.6  0.44  0.14  0.04 
2411  Manufacture of basic chemicals, except fertilizers and nitrogen compounds  87.0  160.7  0.37  0.35  0.07 
2413  Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber  81.0  88.7  0.46  0.51  0.15 
2421  Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products  n.a.  n.a.  0.64  0.44  0.03 
2422  Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics  97.8  164.2  0.60  0.52  0.01 
2423  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products  276.1  56.0  0.17  0.41  0.00 
2424  Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and 
toilet preparations  284.8  424.7  0.52  0.49  0.02 
2429  Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.  n.a.  n.a.  0.53  0.54  0.06 
2430  Manufacture of man-made fibres  75.2  120.0  0.63  0.63  -0.10 
2511  Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres  282.2  156.0  0.57  0.58  0.29 
2519  Manufacture of other rubber products  -3.8  38.1  0.29  0.61  0.15 
2520  Manufacture of plastics products  45.8  70.1  0.31  0.57  0.14 
2610  Manufacture of glass and glass products  188.9  404.5  0.49  0.30  0.03 
2691  Manufacture of non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware  111.0  140.7  0.39  0.31  0.02 
2692  Manufacture of refractory ceramic products  205.8  444.0  0.52  0.57  0.11 
2693  Manufacture of structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products  249.5  110.1  0.03  0.50  0.07 
2694  Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  100.3  154.5  0.13  0.48  0.00 
2695  Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster  143.1  53.5  0.27  0.54  0.05 
2696  Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  -24.4  -71.8  0.08  0.18  0.04 
2710  Manufacture of basic iron and steel  154.2  175.8  0.23  0.49  0.06 














  FOR  BLI  ERP 
2731  Casting of iron and steel  374.6  1223.0  0.63  1.13  0.00 
2811  Manufacture of structural metal products  76.1  53.6  0.45  0.35  0.11 
2812  Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal  159.0  161.2  0.48  0.34  0.12 
2891  Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy  n.a.  n.a.  0.54  1.13  0.00 
2892  Treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering on a fee or contract basis  32.3  219.0  0.64  1.13  0.00 
2893  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware  162.1  188.8  0.40  0.37  0.16 
2899  Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.  187.0  264.9  0.37  -2.70  0.00 
2911  Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines  265.9  491.4  0.64  0.44  0.01 
2912  Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves  129.9  252.5  0.43  0.45  0.05 
2913  Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements  311.3  640.6  0.65  0.33  0.20 
2914  Manufacture of ovens, furnaces and furnace burners  113.7  52.0  0.63  0.39  0.00 
2915  Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment  285.9  589.8  0.64  0.36  0.14 
2919  Manufacture of other general purpose machinery  207.8  82.2  0.54  0.42  0.03 
2922  Manufacture of machine-tools  157.4  625.8  0.46  0.40  0.00 
2924  Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction  n.a.  n.a.  0.16  0.37  0.14 
2925  Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing  -59.2  338.2  0.00  0.40  0.00 
2929  Manufacture of other special purpose machinery  n.a.  n.a.  0.55  0.44  0.00 
2930  Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c.  64.7  128.8  0.62  0.44  0.05 
3000  Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery  9.5  368.5  0.69  0.44  0.00 
3110  Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers  114.2  43.2  0.45  0.30  0.00 
3120  Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus  79.7  151.6  0.64  0.20  -0.01 
3130  Manufacture of insulated wire and cable  219.7  469.6  0.62  0.42  0.06 
3140  Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries  234.1  372.8  0.60  0.48  -0.07 
3150  Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment  48.8  87.1  0.40  0.36  0.04 
3190  Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.  17.1  29.5  0.57  0.23  0.04 
3210  Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components  32.1  -24.1  0.68  0.26  0.02 
3220  Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line 
telegraphy  45.3  23.5  0.57  0.15  0.00 
3230  Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing 
apparatus, and associated goods  -16.0  51.4  0.62  0.15  0.00 














  FOR  BLI  ERP 
3312  Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and 
other purposes, except industrial process control equipment  99.3  10.0  0.64  0.21  0.00 
3320  Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment  198.9  333.2  0.65  0.38  0.00 
3410  Manufacture of motor vehicles  235.7  1.4  0.67  0.33  0.20 
3420  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-
trailers  9.5  285.4  0.53  0.33  0.20 
3430  Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines  86.3  126.2  0.43  0.37  0.14 
3591  Manufacture of motorcycles  226.4  553.3  0.48  0.62  0.39 
3592  Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages  201.8  259.8  0.00  0.62  0.39 
3610  Manufacture of furniture  49.6  23.5  0.26  0.50  0.16 
3691  Manufacture of jewellery and related articles  11.5  94.0  0.40  0.42  0.06 
3693  Manufacture of sports goods  22.7  56.5  0.67  0.48  0.31 
3694  Manufacture of games and toys  -39.7  162.8  0.26  0.59  0.07 
3699  Other manufacturing n.e.c.  68.0  62.9  0.50  0.64  0.33 
  Average  106.93  204.87  0.40  0.46  0.11 
  Max  391.67  3501.79  0.69  1.13  0.58 
  Min  -61.79  -71.76  0.00  -2.70  -0.30 
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